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Philip II of Spain accumulated debts equivalent to 60% of GDP. He also defaulted four 
times on his short-term loans, thus becoming the first serial defaulter in history. Contrary 
to a common view in the literature, we show that lending to the king was profitable even 
under worst-case scenario assumptions. Lenders maintained long-term relationships with 
the crown. Losses sustained during defaults were more than compensated by profits in 
normal times. Defaults were not catastrophic events. In effect, short-term lending acted as 
an insurance mechanism, allowing the king to reduce his payments in harsh times in 
exchange for paying a premium in tranquil periods. 
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I. Introduction 
Sovereign lending is a risky business. From its earliest days, lenders put their fate into the 
hands of princes. Many lost capital, property, and some, their lives. Payment stops, 
defaults, and outright repudiations have been common since individuals and banks started 
lending to sovereigns. A select group of states have failed to honor their obligations 
multiple times, earning the moniker of ‘serial defaulters’ (Reinhart, Rogoff, and 
Savastano 2003).  
Why cross-border lending occurs at all is puzzling. By definition, there is no 
third-party enforcement of the creditor’s rights. Explanations have emphasized the role of 
reputation (Eaton and Gersovitz 1981; Eaton and Fernandez 1995; Tomz 2007), sanctions 
(Bulow and Rogoff 1989; Mitchener and Weidenmier 2010; Conklin 1998), and debt as 
an implicit contingent claim in incomplete markets (Grossman and Van Huyck 1988; Yue 
2006; Kovrijnykh and Szentes 2007; Arellano 2008). Despite the many difficulties in 
making countries pay, sovereign lending on average has been profitable since 1850. 
Restructurings were common in the 19th and 20th century, but bondholders still earned 
respectable returns ex-post (Eichengreen and Portes 1989; Lindert and Morton 1989). 
Sovereign borrowing may therefore be sustainable because ‘Tis better to have lent and 
lost than never to have lent at all’ (Wallich 1943).  
Why lenders should offer funds to countries with a distinguished history of serial 
default is less clear. Reinhart et al. (2003) argue that countries can become ‘debt 
intolerant’. Once a default has occurred, future defaults become more likely. Defaults 
cause a progressive weakening of the borrowing country’s fiscal system. Some borrowers 
have remarkable records: Venezuela has defaulted nine times since 1824, followed by 
Mexico’s eight, and Brazil’s seven. Bank lending to such borrowers is difficult to 
rationalize since a nation’s repayment history is public knowledge. Defaults cannot come 
as a surprise. Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) argue that lending to repeat offenders occurs in 
waves, and is driven by a search for yield at a time when developed country bonds only 
offer low interest rates. As such, changes in investor sentiment could be important   3 
contributors to boom-and-bust cycles in bond markets (Baker and Wurgler 2007; 
Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny 1998).
1  
We examine the first serial defaults in history – the bankruptcies of Philip II of 
Spain (1556-98). During his reign, payments to creditors were suspended four times.
2 
Over the following centuries, Spain (including its predecessor state, the Kingdom of 
Castile) went on to renege on its debts 13 times, making it the world-record holder. Philip 
II’s lenders have long been considered prime examples of irrational exuberance. 
Historians since Braudel (1966) have argued that bankers engaged in lemming-like 
behavior, lending to the king in repeated waves of excessive optimism. We use a dataset 
of 435 original loan contracts from the Archive of Simancas to examine lending to the 
Castilian Crown in the sixteenth century.  
In this paper, we calculate the cash flow for each short-term debt contract of 
Philip II’s reign. Bankers obtained healthy profits by maintaining a long-term lending 
relationship with the Crown. This result takes into account the bankruptcies and the 
restructurings that occurred in the normal course of business. This finding is robust to a 
wide variety of alternative assumptions. The bankruptcies did not affect the cost of 
borrowing. This is consistent with the interpretation that defaults were largely anticipated 
(and already priced-in) by the lenders. Ex-post rates of return – after deducting the 
‘haircuts’ negotiated in the settlements – were proportional to the seriousness of the 
liquidity crisis that prompted each default. Short-term lending thus functioned as 
insurance. The king paid a premium in normal times, but could ‘cash in’ by not servicing 
his debts and reducing the outstanding principal when times were hard.  
Our findings allow us to reject the sentiment hypothesis. We show that long-term 
financial relationships between the Crown and its bankers delivered substantial mutual 
benefits. These findings suggest that even serial defaults need not be cataclysmic events 
for bankers. For the lenders to Philip II, profits and repeated defaults were not mutually 
exclusive. Settlements were negotiated quickly and offered generous terms, at least by 
                                                 
1 A theory of individually rational sentiment shift unrelated to fundamentals is provided by Benabou 
(2009). Recent theoretical work has sought to rationalize endogenous shifts in bond market sentiment as a 
result of investment managers signaling skills (Guerrieri and Kondor 2008).  
2 Philip II only defaulted on short-term loans; long-dated bonds were serviced throughout his reign (with 
the exception of bonds issued as collateral for short-term loans).   4 
19th and 20th century standards. Lending resumed promptly; bankers anticipated that 
losses from the bankruptcies would be offset by profits. 
We are not the first to study sixteenth-century asientos. Carande (1987) examined 
the loans of Charles V, while Ulloa (1977) compiled an overview of Philip’s borrowing. 
Our classification, coding, and elaboration, however, go further than anything attempted 
so far. First, we take advantage of the reorganization of documents at the Archive of 
Simancas to capture the entire population of asientos. Second, we eliminate all instances 
of double counting present in Ulloa’s work.
3 Crucially, we are the first to examine the 
contract clauses themselves, instead of the brief summaries on the first page. In this way, 
estimated returns fully reflect the complexity of loan contracts. 
This research forms part of a larger project on the debts and fiscal position of 
sixteenth-century Castile. Elsewhere, we show that Philip II’s finances were in good 
order, and that his debts were sustainable. The bankruptcies reflected liquidity crises 
rather than solvency problems (Drelichman and Voth 2010a).
4 Bankers lent in 
overlapping syndicates, effectively forming a lenders’ coalition. This prevented the king 
from defaulting opportunistically, and ensured repayment whenever sufficient funds were 
available (Drelichman and Voth 2010b).
5  
We proceed as follows. Section II gives a short historical background and 
introduces the borrowing instruments used by the Crown of Castile. Section III describes 
our data and discusses our assumptions and conventions. Section IV presents our main 
results. Section V provides some additional discussion, and section VI concludes. 
 
                                                 
3 Double counting arose when a field commander entered into a loan directly with a banker, and sent the 
document to Madrid to be ratified. The central treasury would re-issue the loan, or consolidate it into a 
larger one. Both documents were kept in the series. The only way of matching them and eliminate 
duplicates is to read the relevant clauses. 
4 We also compare Castile’s fiscal performance to that of other leading European powers in Drelichman 
and Voth (2010a). 
5 Conklin (1998) and Alvarez Nogal (2003) offer alternative interpretations of the incentives that made 
lending possible.   5 
II. Historical background 
Philip II ruled between 1556 and 1598. In addition to modern-day Spain’s territory, he 
inherited Northern Catalonia,
6 the Low Countries, Naples and Sicily, the Franche-Comté, 
the Duchy of Milan, several North-African outposts, and the American colonies (the 
‘Indies’). He further acquired the Philippines in 1571 and Portugal and its empire in 
1580. While Philip ruled many territories, the Kingdom of Castile provided most 
revenues. Through the marriage of Isabella and Ferdinand in 1469, Castile had gained the 
right to all future colonial acquisitions. This came to include the Indies and their rich 
silver mines. Silver would become one of the most important sources of revenue for 
Philip II, accounting for a quarter of Crown income by the late 16
th century.
7 Taxes and 
silver revenues funded Philip’s bid for supremacy. This involved the king in almost 
continuous wars. Philip II’s empire was at peace for only a single year of his reign 
(Parker 1998). 
War was expensive. Military spending accounted for more than 90% of Crown 
expenditure. Castile relied heavily on borrowing to smooth the fluctuations in revenues 
and to be able to increase expenditure when necessary. Philip II used both long- and 
short-term debt, in the form of instruments known as juros and asientos.  
Juros 
Long-term bonds were called juros. These were either perpetuities or, less commonly, 
lifetime annuities. They varied in terms of face value and interest rate. They were backed 
by specific tax streams. Payments were collected directly from the tax administrators. 
The Cortes – the representative assembly of Castile – had the prerogative of designating 
which tax streams could be used to back long-term bonds. This placed an effective 
ceiling on juro issuance, making them one of the safest investments available.
8  Juros 
                                                 
6 It was ceded to France in the Treaty of the Pyrenees (1659). 
7 See Drelichman and Voth (2010a) for a reconstruction of every Castilian revenue stream on an annual 
basis for the years 1556 to 1596. Other relevant works on sixteenth-century Castilian fiscality include Ruiz 
Martín (1965), Ulloa (1977), Artola (1982), Thompson (1994), Gelabert (1999), Yun Casalilla (2002, 
2004), Sanz Ayán (2004), Marcos Martín (2000), and De Carlos Morales (2008). 
8 The ceiling was raised only a few times in the 16
th century. The relationship between the Crown and the 
Cortes has been the subject of extensive study. Some representative treatments are Carretero Zamora 
(1988), Jago (1981; 1985), Thompson (1976, 1993, 1994), Fortea Pérez (2009), and the proceedings of the   6 
were widely held by institutions and individuals in Castile and the rest of Europe, and 
were never defaulted upon in the sixteenth century. While their stock grew during our 
period of analysis, our knowledge of their specific dynamics is imperfect. The archival 
record is essentially intractable, and only summary estimates exist for specific years.
9 
Table 1 provides an overview. 
Table 1: Stock, service and cost of long-term debt (in millions of current ducats). 
Year  Outstanding Juros  Juros Servicing 
Cost 
Average Cost of 
Juro Service 
Revenue 
1560  19  1.468  7.7%  3.155 
1565  25      4.192 
1566    1.861    7.4% 
†  4.770 
1573    2.752    5.433 
1575  42.5  2.730  6.4%  7.606 
1584    3.273    7.806 
1598  68  4.634  6.8%  11.328
†† 
Source: debt estimates for 1560, 1565 and 1598 are from Artola (1982); the figure for 1575 is from De 
Carlos Morales (2008). Service estimates are from Ruíz Martín (1965) and Ulloa (1977). Revenues are 
from Drelichman and Voth (2010a). 
† Calculated using 1565 stock of juros. 
†† Figure from 1596. 
 
Long-term debt grew in parallel with royal revenue.
10 Most juros carried an interest rate 
of 7.14%, and were sold at par. This is the rate we use in later calculations. In addition to 
standard issuance, bankers received large tranches of juros during the settlements with 
the Crown in 1577 and 1597. These carried an interest rate of 5%. As Table 1 shows, the 
average cost of juro borrowing therefore fell in the late 16
th century. 
Asientos 
Juros could only be issued against revenue that the Cortes designated as ‘ordinary’. 
Between 1555 and 1596, ordinary revenues averaged only 55% of total income and, 
                                                                                                                                                
Congreso Científico sobre la Historia de las Cortes de Castilla y León (Las Cortes de Castilla y León en la 
Edad Moderna  1989). 
9 While the National Historical Archive and the Archive of Simancas hold thousands of juros, no central 
registry exists. Only a small fraction is catalogued, and bonds are only identified by the name of the first 
holder. This makes it impossible to search them by date, tax stream, location or any other useful 
characteristic. Finally, only bonds that ever changed hands (and hence had to be re-issued) are preserved in 
the archives, imparting a serious bias to the documentary record. These difficulties explain the sparse 
literature on juros, with the most comprehensive overview provided by Toboso Sánchez (1987). 
10 All our statements on the evolution of Castile’s fiscal position are based on Drelichman and Voth 
(2010a).    7 
crucially, did not include silver. The king used short-term debt contracts called asientos 
to borrow against other revenues. Asientos had been introduced by Charles V, Philip’s 
father.
11 Within one year of acceding to the throne, Philip II stopped servicing these 
debts. A short-lived plan to restart lending did not prosper, and a second payment stop 
was declared in 1560. The first two defaults of Philip’s reign were eventually resolved 
with a deal brokered by Genoese banking families. Short-term lending restarted in earnest 
in 1566. 
  The Genoese introduced several innovations in asiento contracts. The most 
important one was collateralization with long-term bonds. Collateral clauses gave 
bankers the right to hold juros until the loan was discharged in full, and to sell them in 
case it was not. At the end of a contract, bankers could often keep the collateral in lieu of 
payment. This made the Genoese large intermediaries in the juro market.
12 Controlling 
both long and short-term debt gave bankers substantial leverage when negotiating with 
the king.
13 
  Asientos could be complex. Disbursement would often occur in distant places, and 
in foreign currency. Repayments mostly took place in Castile. The contracts typically 
specified the source to be used for servicing a specific asiento. These included general 
revenue, specific taxes, and the silver fleets. Juros were often used as means of 
repayment as well. The disbursement and repayment schedule could be staggered, 
increasing and reducing the bankers’ exposure several times over the life of a loan. 
Contingent scenarios were often built into the contract, modifying the baseline cash flows 
if certain events occurred. Examples include the arrival date of the silver fleet or the 
insufficient revenue for a specific tax. Some contracts give additional options to either 
king or banker, such as the ability to change the repayment stream or to modify the 
timing of a payment; these changes could be subject to a penalty. 
                                                 
11 The standard reference on the asientos of Charles V is Carande (1987). 
12 See Torres López and Pérez-Prendes (1963). De Carlos Morales (2008, pp. 95-96) shows that the 
Genoese were involved in the placement of 60% of all outstanding juros. 
13 See Drelichman and Voth (2010b) for an analysis of the king’s incentive to repay.    8 
The defaults 
The early defaults of 1557 and 1560 affected the debts Philip II had inherited from 
Charles V. These funds had been provided by German bankers. Since the systematic 
record at the Archive of Simancas begins in 1566, we are unable to study these early 
episodes.
14 Our analysis begins with the Genoese system, introduced in the 1560s, and 
focuses on the defaults of 1575 and 1596. 
In the first half of the 1570s, Castile was engaged in two major wars, one in 
Flanders and the other against the Ottomans. Silver remittances in 1572, 1573 and 1574 
turned out to be unusually poor. Faced with high expenditures and low silver revenues, 
the king requested a large tax increase from the Cortes.
15 An agreement was only reached 
in 1575, too late to prevent the payment stop on 14.6 million ducats of asientos, as well 
as on the juros that served as collateral. King and bankers settled in late 1577. On 
average, the king repaid 62% of outstanding loans, using juros issued against the new 
taxes approved by the Cortes. The bankers in turn agreed to provide a new loan for five 
million ducats.  
  Between 1576 and 1583, military expenditure fell sharply. Castile’s finances 
improved as a result. New taxes and rising silver remittances reinforced this trend. 
Starting in 1584, however, renewed fighting caused a turn for the worse. Philip launched 
a new offensive against the Dutch rebels and began preparations to invade England with 
the ‘Invincible Armada’. Its defeat in 1588 required additional defense expenditures – the 
fleet needed to be rebuilt, and coastal fortifications strengthened against possible attack. 
These costs strained the royal treasury. Despite the introduction of new excises in 1591 – 
the millones – the Crown defaulted again in 1596. This affected 7 million ducats of 
asientos – less than half of the 1575 amount. Crown and bankers agreed on a settlement 
in less than a year. It involved a 20% reduction of payments due. 
  While Philip’s defaults were spectacular events that sent shockwaves throughout 
European financial markets, they only affected a small proportion of Castile’s 
obligations. Asientos constituted only a quarter of the debt stock in 1575. In 1596, short-
                                                 
14 For a comprehensive overview of the state of knowledge about the first two defaults, see De Carlos 
Morales (2008). 
15 Lovett (1980, 1982) provides a general description of the 1575 crisis and its resolution. For a discussion 
of the interaction between the Crown and the Cortes during the crisis, see Jago (1985).   9 
term loans accounted for less than 10% of total debt. The defaults of Philip II were 
partial: with the exception of bonds used as collateral, juros continued to be serviced 
without interruption. Defaults thus reflected temporary liquidity shortfalls. Compared to 
modern reschedulings, settlements were reached quickly.
16 In the remainder of the paper, 
we show that lenders obtained rates of return that exceeded their opportunity cost and 
explore what determined the profitability of short term lending.  
 
III. Data 
Between 1566 and 1600, Philip II entered into 435 asientos with his bankers.
17 The 
contracts consist of 4,997 handwritten pages. With the exception of a short standardized 
closing paragraph, each document is entirely composed of contractual clauses. 
To estimate the rates of return for each contract, we need to reconstruct the cash 
flows they generated. We transcribed every single clause, converted foreign currency into 
ducats (the Castilian unit of account), valued the assets involved, and coded the result as 
an inflow or outflow for the banker at a monthly frequency.
18 Whenever a clause lent 
itself to ambiguous interpretation, we chose the reading that resulted in a lower return for 
the lender. We also coded several additional variables, including the identity and family 
of the lender, the places of disbursement and repayment, whether a foreign exchange 
transaction took place and at what cost, and the type and quantity of collateral posted. We 
now illustrate this process with a sample contract.  
The brothers Pedro and Francisco de Maluenda entered into a contract with the 
king on July 13, 1595.
19 They agreed to deliver 349,464 ducats in Lisbon in 13 
                                                 
16 In Drelichman and Voth (2010a), we show that Philip II’s debts were sustainable overall. 
17 Of the 435 contracts, 24 are damaged beyond usability or are not actually original loans, but rather pure 
transfers or restructurings of earlier obligations. A further 9 contain incomplete information – suitable for 
summary statistics but not for estimating rates of return. The empirical analysis is thus based on either 411 
or 402 loans depending on the data requirements.  
18 To calculate amounts in different currencies, we first converted units of account into circulating coins, 
and then coins into their gold content. We rely on Munro (2004) for most values. When a contract mentions 
a specific exchange value, we use it instead. 
19 AGS, Contadurías Generales, Legajo 92. ‘Los dichos Francisco y Pedro de Maluenda. Asiento tomado 
con ellos en 13 de julio de 1595 sobre 439,500 ducados que han de proveer en Lisboa.’   10 
payments.
20 The first payment, for 26,856 ducats, was due eight days after the contract 
date. The remaining 12 payments, of 26,884 ducats each, were due at the end of each 
month, starting in July 1595. The king promised to repay as follows: 
•  A payment of 75,000 ducats from the general treasury in November 1595. 
•  A payment of 97,000 ducats one month after the arrival of the first treasure fleet. 
•  The amounts in the first two payments would accrue 1% monthly (simple, not 
compounding) interest starting from the month of August. 
•  A payment of 1,950 ducats in October 1595 to cover miscellaneous transaction 
costs. The bankers did not have to itemize expenses. 
•  A final payment one month after the arrival of the fleet of 1596. This payment 
was calculated on the basis of the outstanding 177,000 ducats, plus 1% monthly 
interest from October 1595, plus an additional 2% of the base amount for ‘other 
costs’.  
If the fleet of 1596 failed to reach Seville by December, the bankers had the option of 
requesting payment in the form of lifetime juros for the same face value as the 
outstanding payment, with a maximum rate of 7.14%. Finally, there was a standard set of 
clauses allowing the bankers to export the bullion needed to disburse funds abroad, as 
well as protection against changes in the metallic content of the currency. 
The Maluenda contract is relatively simple. Because the deliveries were made 
through letters of exchange denominated in Castilian ducats, and the repayments were 
made in Castile itself, no currency conversion was necessary. The only uncertainty arose 
from the arrival of the fleets. We assume that the bankers expected the fleets to reach 
Spain in September, their median arrival month (see appendix A for a detailed discussion 
of this assumption). Payment was therefore expected in October. If the fleet arrived later, 
the monthly 1% interest charge would accrue until the payments were made or the 
bankers received juros. Lifetime juros have a present value that is lower than their face 
value. We therefore disregard the option of the banker taking them in lieu of payment 
                                                 
20 The summary on the front page of the contract describes the principal as consisting of 349,500 ducats. 
These small discrepancies, in all likelihood introduced for rounding convenience, are not uncommon. The 
relevant amounts, which we use throughout our empirical exercises, are those in the specific clauses.     11 
when calculating ex-ante returns.
21 The cash flows implied by our method are reported in 
Table 2. 
Table 2: Agreed cash flows in the contract with the Maluenda brothers. 
Month  Disbursements  Repayments  Net cash flow  Description 
Jul-95  53,740    -53,740  Initial disbursement of 26,856 ducats; first 
monthly disbursement of 26,884 ducats. 
Aug-95  26,884    -26,884  Monthly disbursement. 
Sep-95  26,884    -26,884  Monthly disbursement. 
Oct-95  26,884  100,890  74,006 
Monthly disbursement; repayment of 1,950 ducats; 
repayment of 97,000 ducats plus 1% simple 
interest for two months. 
Nov-95  26,884  77,250  50,366  Monthly disbursement; repayment of 75,000 
ducats plus 1% simple interest for three months. 
Dec-95  26,884    -26,884  Monthly disbursement. 
Jan-96  26,884    -26,884  Monthly disbursement. 
Feb-96  26,884    -26,884  Monthly disbursement. 
Mar-96  26,884    -26,884  Monthly disbursement. 
Apr-96  26,884    -26,884  Monthly disbursement. 
May-96  26,884    -26,884  Monthly disbursement. 
Jun-96  26,884    -26,884  Monthly disbursement. 
Jul-96  0    0   
Aug-96  0    0   
Sep-96  0    0   
Oct-96  0  201,780  201,780  Final repayment of 177,000 ducats plus 1% simple 
interest for 12 months plus 2% lump sum bonus. 
 
In constructing the cash flows, we needed to adopt several conventions. The asiento 
described above illustrates our treatment of payments tied to the arrival of the fleets. 
Other assumptions relate to the valuation of juros used for repayment. As a general rule, 
we used the cash flows of the juros themselves, and calculated their net present value. 
Appendix A describes the process and assumptions.  
 
                                                 
21 Bankers could request juros yielding a maximum of 7.14%. Under our discount rate assumption (also 
7.14%), the present value of lifetime juros of any allowed yield would have been lower than their face 
value. We discuss this at length in appendix A.   12 
Table 3: Summary statistics 
Variable  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
principal   219,053    108,333    317,301    2,080    2,648,000  
foreign exchange  41%    0.49  0  1 
duration   27   21  22.67  0  140 
collateral  32%    0.47  0  1 
% collateralized
†  121%  100%  0.66  0  612% 
restructuring  19%    0.39  0  1 
nominal rate
††  9.3%  12.0%  0.05  0  16% 
Note: statistics for 411 observations (except as noted); principal is the total amount ever disbursed on each 
contract, in current ducats; foreign exchange is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the contract includes 
a foreign exchange transaction; duration is the maximum number of months a contract could be in good 
standing; collateral is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if any portion of a contract was collateralized; % 
collateralized indicates what percentage of the capital was backed by collateral; restructuring is a dummy 
variable taking the value 1 if the contract restructured an earlier one; nominal rate is the interest rate 
explicitly stated in the contract. 
† Statistics for 134 contracts with collateral. 
††Statistics for 335 contracts that state an interest rate explicitly. 
Table 3 reports summary statistics for our data. The average loan amount was 219,000 
ducats; some contracts were issued for as little as a few thousand. The largest contract, 
for well over 2.5 million ducats, was issued as part of the 1575 settlement. The second 
largest loan still exceeded 2.1 million ducats. 41% of contracts involved foreign exchange 
operations. The median duration was 21 months. Some contracts lasted for over 10 years, 
while others could be as short as a few days. The latter were usually transfers, which 
involved a relatively brief credit transaction as well. One third of all contracts had some 
collateral attached to them. The median amount collateralized was 100% of the principal. 
Where it exceeded principal, it was intended to cover interest as well. Collateral could 
also be used to enhance the return of a contract by allowing the banker to purchase it at a 
discount at maturity. 19% of all contracts mention previously unmet obligations. In order 
to avoid double counting, we do not include these amounts in our cash flows. The king 
normally paid the overdue amounts in full and compensated the bankers for the additional 
delay. We discuss the implications of these overdue payments for profitability in more 
detail in section V. 
  335 contracts explicitly specify an interest rate (‘nominal rate’ in Table 3). These 
were relatively low, and varied from 0 to 16%. In an age that took a dim view of lending 
against interest in general, the use of low ‘headline figures’ is unsurprising. These are   13 
usually 9% before 1570, 12% by 1575 and 16% by the end of the century. The actual rate 
of return of these contracts as it emerges from the cash flows was usually higher. Some 
contracts actually specify that the banker will receive no interest. This was typically the 
case when the loan funded a religious building, such as the monastery of El Escorial. 
Bankers that lent without interest in one transaction normally received ample 
compensation in the next contract. When establishing profitability it is therefore 
important to look beyond individual contracts, and also examine banking families as the 
unit of analysis. 
 
IV. The returns to lending 
This section first describes the different measures we use to calculate the rate of return, 
and then reports our estimates for individual contracts, for overall lending to the king, and 
for lending by banking family. We next examine the correlates of contract profitability, 
and how lending rates evolved over time. Our main conclusion – that lending to Philip II 
was consistently profitable – is robust to a variety of alternative assumptions. 
Measuring returns 
We use two different profitability measures to calculate the returns of contractual flows: 
the modified internal rate of return (MIRR) and the profit index (PI). Each has its 
advantages and drawbacks, which we discuss below. Virtually all our findings are robust 
to the choice of measure. 
The MIRR is defined as the ratio between the future value of positive cash flows 
and the present value of negative cash flows. The formula is  
  (1) 
where n is the number of periods in the contract. If the lender receives positive cash flows 
before the end of the contract, the assumption is that they can be reinvested at rate rr. 
Negative cash flows after the start of the loan are discounted at rate rf.  
Using the MIRR is attractive because of the nature of asiento contracts. The cash 
flow of many asientos turned from positive to negative and back several times over the 
lifetime of a loan. Our sample contract with the Maluenda brothers is a case in point. The   14 
obvious alternative to the MIRR is the internal rate of return (IRR), a common measure 
in corporate finance. It is defined as the discount rate that makes the NPV of a series of 
cash flows equal to zero. The IRR is unsuitable to our data. It performs well only in the 
case of simple cash flows, with a single disbursement followed by a single repayment. 
Whenever there are intermediate cash flows, two problems arise. First, the IRR formula 
assumes that any intermediate positive cash flows can be reinvested at the same rate of 
return as the entire project. This is unrealistic; there was no infinitely elastic demand for 
loan contracts by the Crown. The banker’s obvious alternative was to invest repayments 
in juros. Because juros yielded less than asientos, the IRR would overestimate the 
profitability of the contract. Second, intermediate negative cash flows can cause the IRR 
formula to yield multiple solutions, or none at all. Since most asientos specified 
staggered disbursements and intermediate repayments, we do not use the IRR. 
  The MIRR has the advantage of yielding a unique solution. In the absence of 
intermediate cash flows, it is identical to the IRR. Just as the IRR, it can be interpreted as 
the rate of return that makes the NPV of the project equal to zero. The MIRR requires 
explicit assumptions about the reinvestment and the finance rate. For our benchmark 
estimates, we use the juro yield of 7.14% as the reinvestment rate, and 5% as the finance 
rate. These are conservative choices intended to produce lower bound estimates of 
profitability. Appendix B discusses them in detail. We also conduct sensitivity analysis 
with alternative parameter values. 
  The profit index is defined as the NPV of a contract divided by capital at risk. Its 
advantage over the MIRR is that it only requires specifying one discount rate. The 
drawback is that the concept of ‘capital at risk’ is not well defined when there are 
multiple staggered disbursements and repayments. Disbursements increase capital at risk, 
while repayments diminish them. A long contract with a single repayment at the end 
exposes the lender to more risk than one where much of the loan is repaid quickly. We 
measure capital at risk as the total amount disbursed over the life of the contract. This 
overstates the true exposure, which was reduced by intermediate repayments. We also do 
not discount future disbursements, but rather use their full value. In combination, these 
assumptions introduce a downward bias.   15 
  The main difference between the MIRR and the PI is that the former is a gross 
measure, while the latter is net of the opportunity cost – which we take to be the juro 
yield. To compare them, the juro rate must be first subtracted from the MIRR. Next, the 
discount rates used differ conceptually. In the MIRR, the reinvestment and finance rates 
refer to the yield of alternative assets. In the PI, the discount rate is a subjective measure 
that combines the opportunity cost of funds and the risk aversion of the investor. Finally, 
as we discuss in the analysis, the MIRR is not well suited to evaluating long loans. When 
maturity is relevant, we use the PI instead. 
Scenarios 
We derive our data from the contracts as agreed between king and bankers. In many 
cases, the original agreement was not respected to the letter. 119 contracts were affected 
by the 1575 or the 1596 bankruptcy. Delays in both disbursements and repayments were 
common even in normal times. Almost 20% of loans contain clauses rescheduling 
previously unfulfilled obligations. Without observing the actual cash flows, we cannot 
derive precise measures of ex-post profitability. Nonetheless, we can bound the likely 
returns. We do so by using our knowledge of the defaults and their settlements to 
approximate the cash flows that actually occurred. 
First, we calculate the profitability of each contract assuming that its clauses were 
respected to the letter. This is our upper bound. Next, we consider what would have 
happened if, in the 1575 and 1596 bankruptcies, the king had repudiated all the 
outstanding debt. This yields a (very low) lower bound.
22 Finally, we approximate the 
actual cash flows by estimating the settlement payments made by the king on each 
contract affected by the defaults. To illustrate the three scenarios, we return to the 
contract with the Maluenda brothers. 
                                                 
22 Note that it is not realistic to assume that any one banker could have earned a return as low as the one 
implied by this scenario – he would in all likelihood not have lent again after 1575.   16 




Settlements  Repudiation 
Jul-95  -53,740  -53,740  -53,740 
Aug-95  -26,884  -26,884  -26,884 
Sep-95  -26,884  -26,884  -26,884 
Oct-95  74,006  74,006  74,006 
Nov-95  50,366  50,366  50,366 
Dec-95  -26,884  -26,884  -26,884 
Jan-96  -26,884  -26,884  -26,884 
Feb-96  -26,884  -26,884  -26,884 
Mar-96  -26,884  -26,884  -26,884 
Apr-96  -26,884  -26,884  -26,884 
May-96  -26,884  -26,884  -26,884 
Jun-96  -26,884  -26,884  -26,884 
Jul-96       
Aug-96       
Sep-96       
Oct-96  201,780     
. 
. 
.   
. 
. 
.   
Oct-97    137,059   
       
Yearly MIRR  12.5%  -5.3%  -61.1% 
Yearly PI  6.8%  -14.8%  -55.4% 
 
The first column in Table 4 reproduces the cash flows agreed in the original contract. 
Using our benchmark reinvestment and finance rate, the expected MIRR was 12.5%, a 
healthy 5.4% above the juro rate. The PI was 6.8%. In October 1596, however, the king 
decreed the fourth suspension of payments of his reign. The fleet of 1596 did not arrive 
until late October, and hence we know with certainty that the final payment of the 
contract did not take place.
23 Had the king repudiated the outstanding debt, the returns 
would have been strongly negative. Note that the majority of contracts would not have 
had such poor returns even under repudiation. Most were repaid partially or fully before 
the defaults took place. Bankers who had not disbursed the full loan amount could have 
stopped further payments. The Maluenda contract illustrates what could have happened in 
a worst-case scenario to a particularly unlucky set of bankers. In actual fact, such a dire 
scenario did not materialize. The king agreed to repay 80% of outstanding debts in 
October 1597. The ‘settlement’ column reports our estimate of the actual cash flow. 
Since the language in most contracts does not distinguish between capital repayment and 
interest, we assume that all payments go towards capital amortization first. This produces 
                                                 
23 We use the dates of arrival of the fleets in Morineau (1985).   17 
a lower bound for outstanding capital at the time of the default, and hence for the 
settlement payment. By this methodology, as of October 1596, the king would have owed 
the Maluenda brothers 171,324 ducats from this particular contract.
24 We multiply this 
amount by 0.8 and enter it as a positive cash flow in October 1597. This yields a MIRR 
of -5.3% (quite comparable to the PI of -14.8%).
25 
  While the 1597 settlement imposed a uniform 20% reduction on outstanding 
claims for all contracts, terms varied in 1575 according to how a contract was 
collateralized.
26 Bankers that held standard juros as collateral recovered 70% of their 
claims; bankers holding juros guaranteed by the Casa de la Contratación received 55%; 
uncollateralized loans were granted 42%. For contracts affected by the 1575 default, we 
calculate the recovery rates for each contract based on the type of collateral used.  
Overall profitability of lending 
We first consider overall short-term lending to Philip II. Did bankers on the whole – i.e. 
when aggregated into a fictitious single financial entity for the years 1566-1600 – make 
money by lending to the king? Table 5 reports 24 profitability estimates – MIRRs for 
three repayment scenarios, each for eight pairs of reinvestment and finance rates. These 
are averages of each contract’s MIRR, weighted by the amounts disbursed. Our 
benchmark estimate, using a reinvestment rate of 7.14% and a finance rate of 5%, is 
shown in bold.  
                                                 
24 Because the clause structure in this particular contract is detailed, it is possible to calculate that 
outstanding capital at the time of the default was 177,000 ducats. Its MIRR would have therefore been -
4.6%. Few contracts contain similar detail. We therefore apply the ‘capital amortization first’ methodology 
uniformly. 
25 While the Maluenda brothers lost money on this particular contract, their overall relationship with the 
king was profitable. They lent over 4.3 million ducats to Philip II, realizing a MIRR of 20.6% after taking 
into account the effects of the defaults. 
26 We describe the terms of each medio general in full detail in the appendix to the online version of 
Drelichman and Voth (2010a).   18 
Table 5: MIRR estimates (all contracts, 1566-1600, annualized rates). 
Reinvestment 
rate  Finance rate  Original 
agreement  Settlements   Repudiation 
         
0.00%  0.00%  15.7%  11.6%  3.0% 
5.00%  0.00%  17.7%  13.6%  5.1% 
7.14%  0.00%  18.6%  14.5%  6.0% 
10.00%  0.00%  19.8%  15.7%  7.2% 
         
0.00%  5.00%  16.7%  12.5%  4.0% 
5.00%  5.00%  18.8%  14.6%  6.1% 
7.14%  5.00%  19.7%  15.5%  7.0% 
10.00%  5.00%  20.9%  16.7%  8.2% 
 
Average returns as stipulated in the original agreements were above 15%. Philip’s 
bankers did not sign up to lose money. This is true independent of the finance and 
reinvestment rate used. That lending was profitable is borne out clearly in the 
‘repudiation’ column. It shows that the bankruptcies would not have been catastrophic for 
lenders even if they had failed to recover a single ducat. Combining this assumption with 
the lower bounds for both reinvestment and finance rates, lenders would have obtained an 
annualized return of 3%.
27 This would not have covered their opportunity costs in full, 
but it would not have led to capital losses. If more realistic parameters are used, lenders’ 
profits come close to or exceed the opportunity cost even under a complete repudiation 
scenario. 
The ‘settlements’ column gives our (conservative) best guess of actual returns.  
The most pessimistic value is again obtained when setting both the reinvestment and the 
finance rates equal to zero. Even under this extreme assumption, which essentially holds 
that bankers had no alternative use for their cash, the overall return is 11.6%, almost 
4.5% above the yield of long-term debt. Our benchmark estimate uses a more realistic 
7.14% reinvestment rate and 5% finance rate. In that case, short-term lending yielded a 
return of 15.5%, more than double that of long-dated bonds. 
As is apparent from Table 5, the MIRR reacts differentially to different finance 
and reinvestment rate assumptions. Intermediate negative cash flows are relatively small. 
                                                 
27 Note that the first derivative of the MIRR with respect to the finance rate is positive, and hence the value 
of the finance rate that produces a lower bound is zero. Appendix B explains this behavior in detail.   19 
Hence, the finance rate has little impact on the overall result. Sensitivity is greater for the 
reinvestment rate. All the results in Table 5 are preserved when we use the profit index 
instead of the MIRR as our profitability measure. Appendix C reports the actual values. 
Profitability by family 
While the results presented so far show that lending to Philip II was profitable even under 
very unfavorable assumptions, average returns can mask considerable variation across 
lenders. We now examine rates of return by family.  
  Between 1566 and 1596, 145 different bankers belonging to 78 families engaged 
in business with Philip II. However, only 127 bankers, belonging to 60 families, ever 
risked capital. The rest provided intermediation services without putting their own 
resources on the line. We therefore analyze only the profitability of the 60 families 
engaged in lending.   20 
Table 6: MIRR by family (1566-1600, annualized rates)  
Family name  Original 
agreement 
Settlements  Repudiation  Total amount ever 
disbursed 
Spinola  20.6%  19.3%  16.8%   16,359,959  
Grimaldo  18.6%  11.7%  2.6%   7,306,110  
Lomelin  23.8%  17.3%  0.8%   5,219,088  
Fucar  11.4%  6.2%  -3.8%   4,951,107  
Maluenda  26.1%  20.6%  10.9%   4,360,131  
Torre  22.2%  16.1%  3.0%   4,142,326  
Espinosa  12.0%  8.4%  6.8%   3,405,119  
Centurion  19.3%  17.2%  10.9%   3,253,726  
Gentil  19.9%  15.6%  8.8%   2,927,399  
Marin  20.1%  20.0%  19.3%   2,646,472  
Vitoria  19.4%  10.4%  -19.7%   2,063,816  
Doria  23.8%  13.8%  -4.1%   2,027,106  
Judice  27.0%  27.0%  27.0%   1,697,703  
Latorre  11.5%  11.5%  11.5%   1,489,818  
Carlessequi  16.1%  16.1%  16.1%   1,425,315  
Cataneo  21.5%  7.6%  -5.1%   1,226,934  
Isunza  25.0%  24.8%  23.6%   1,171,464  
Ruiz  9.9%  7.5%  -7.9%   1,140,276  
Salamanca  11.8%  11.8%  11.8%   1,005,657  
Fiesco  24.5%  16.6%  -5.0%   995,290  
Fornari  16.7%  8.1%  -8.6%   940,188  
Grillo  27.8%  21.4%  12.6%   930,411  
Justiniano  25.9%  15.9%  -11.4%   786,673  
De Negro  18.1%  13.8%  -12.9%   769,407  
Pasqual  21.8%  16.1%  16.1%   582,976  
Lercaro  12.4%  3.1%  -13.2%   551,300  
Suarez  22.2%  21.0%  20.5%   525,413  
Isla  10.8%  10.8%  10.8%   497,175  
Serra  8.0%  2.9%  -12.3%   458,178  
Herrera  10.8%  10.8%  10.8%   451,234  
Galletto  13.9%  -11.3%  -100.0%   407,817  
Carmona  17.8%  17.8%  17.8%   395,333  
Salazar  17.8%  17.8%  17.8%   395,333  
Pinelo  15.8%  15.8%  15.8%   341,405  
Mena  17.0%  10.6%  -6.0%   306,982  
Murain  8.1%  8.1%  8.1%   299,000  
Cambi  9.6%  8.3%  6.7%   275,549  
Salinas  17.3%  -10.5%  -22.7%   264,440  
Adorno  31.0%  31.0%  31.0%   230,938  
Curiel de la Torre  151.1%  151.1%  151.1%   186,309  
Sauli  21.7%  5.8%  -30.0%   126,605  
Corvari  23.4%  23.4%  23.4%   119,224  
Diaz Aguilar   9.9%  9.9%  9.9%   118,480  
Sabago  16.5%  16.5%  16.5%   100,155  
Obada  8.3%  8.3%  8.3%   100,000  
Franquis  9.4%  9.4%  9.4%   83,000  
Villaldo  20.5%  20.5%  20.5%   77,409  
Aponal  32.1%  32.1%  32.1%   67,026  
Salucio  78.2%  78.2%  78.2%   60,027  
Interiano  31.1%  31.1%  31.1%   53,333  
Calvo  12.4%  12.4%  12.4%   50,000  
Serna  12.9%  12.9%  12.9%   30,581  
Vicuña  12.9%  12.9%  12.9%   30,581  
Palavecin  8.6%  -5.5%  -50.7%   28,601  
Cibo  67.3%  67.3%  67.3%   19,624  
Picamillo  15.6%  15.6%  15.6%   16,184  
Rastrogago  19.1%  19.1%  19.1%   15,000  
Lago  19.1%  19.1%  19.1%   15,000  
San Vitores  8.6%  -4.9%  -45.3%   6,110  
Bobadilla  10.0%  -0.6%  -14.8%   2,080  
Note: The reinvestment rate is assumed to be 7.14%, the finance rate 5%. The amounts 
disbursed are expressed in ducats. We use the Spanish spellings of the family names, as 
they appear in the archival documents.   21 
 
Table 6 reports the MIRR by family for the 1566-1600 period. As before, we use the 
amounts disbursed to calculate a weighted average. Families are ranked by the total 
amount lent over the period as a whole. Credit provision was heavily concentrated. The 
Spinola family, which counted 12 active members, lent over 20% of all funds. The top 10 
families provided just short of 70% of all loans, and 19 families lent over 1 million ducats 
each.
28 
Rates of return varied considerably by family. No family agreed to compensation 
below the 7.14% juro rate.
29 In the event of a complete repudiation, 18 families would 
have lost money. The remaining 42 families, however, would have realized positive rates 
of return; 37 of them would have earned more than the juro rate.
30 
According to our best estimate of actual profitability, only five families had a 
negative MIRR; fully 51 earned more than the long-term bond yield. Of the five families 
that actually lost money, three invested little: 2,080, 6,110 and 28,601 ducats 
respectively. All five entered into one or two contracts with the king, closely before the 
defaults. The Galletto and Salinas families sustained losses on somewhat larger contracts, 
but their rates of return, -11.3% and -10.5%, are hardly catastrophic.
31 The absolute 
losses of these five families amount to just over 75,000 ducats. This is less than 0.1% of 
total short-term lending to Philip II. 
According to the ‘settlement’ scenario, four families did not lose money in 
absolute value but failed to earn the juro rate. One of these was the Fucar (Fugger) 
family. As a matter of fact, the Fugger were the only family exempted from the 
                                                 
28 We have already examined the concentration of lending in Drelichman and Voth (2010b). Our previous 
results differ from the current ones in the order of one percentage point. The reason is that in our previous 
paper we included pure transfers, while here we focus on capital actually at risk. 
29 This validates our choice of the juro rate as an upper bound for the opportunity cost of funds. 
30 Note that families that were not affected by the defaults have the same rate of return under each of the 
three scenarios. 
31 In fact, the Galletto family signed its only contract just four days before the 1596 bankruptcy. In all 
likelihood the disbursement was never made, and the family did not suffer any losses. We nonetheless 
assume the contract was carried out in order to bias the results against finding profitability. The repudiation 
scenario, therefore, shows a profitability of -100% – the family would have lost the entire amount 
disbursed.   22 
provisions of the 1575 bankruptcy.
32 Their actual rate of return, therefore, was the 
originally contracted 11.4%. The other three families were the Lercaro (3.1%), Serra 
(2.9%) and Sauli (5.8%). The last two had only a sporadic relationship with the king, and 
happened to lend just prior to the defaults. The Lercaro lent somewhat larger amounts 
throughout the entire period– just over 550,000 ducats. These loans were provided in the 
run-up to the bankruptcies, and the reduction in payment obligations caused them earn 
less than they would have by investing in juros. 
Three of the MIRRs reported in Table 6 are unusually high. Juan Curiel de la 
Torre earned over 151% on lending of some 186,000 ducats. The Salucio and Cibo 
families also earned in excess of 50%. Curiel de la Torre achieved such a high return 
through a combination of factors. He had high returns on small contracts, and he kept his 
exposure to a minimum by staggering disbursements and repayments.
33 The Salucio and 
Cibo lent little, and hence did not obtain large absolute gains. 
Correlates of return rates 
Table 6 reveals considerable heterogeneity in the rate of returns at the family level. 
Across individual loans, the spread is even more marked. What explains the cross-section 
of returns to lending? Were some bankers obtaining preferential treatment? Or does the 
variation mostly reflect the different characteristics of each loan? 
We begin by examining some of the patterns of association between contract 
characteristics and the lending rate agreed. The first factor to note is that many loans 
contained a foreign exchange component. These are, on average, more expensive. Figure 
1 plots the density functions of the profitability for loans with and without an explicit 
foreign currency clause. While there is a lot of variation in the interest rates charged, the 
difference in the means and modes is clear. Loans with a foreign exchange component 
had an unweighted mean (median) interest rate of 27% (17%); those without, of 19% 
                                                 
32 In this way, the Fugger were compensated for the continued provision of transfer services during the 
payment moratorium. See Drelichman and Voth (2010b) for a discussion of the rationale for this 
exemption. 
33 We calculate profitability using the net disbursements as weights for each individual contract. Curiel’s 
disbursements were timed to coincide with repayments from the king. Even though the contracts were 
nominally for large amounts, his actual net exposure was low, and hence his returns on capital at risk were 
high. The effect is particularly noticeable because he did not lend very large amounts.   23 
(11%). Thus, the cost to the Crown of contracting debts that also involved payments 
(normally, disbursements) in foreign specie raised the cost of a loan by 6-9% on average.  
Figure 1: Density of MIRRs by foreign exchange clauses 
 
The second factor that influenced the cost of loans was the maturity of the loan. Since the 
MIRR is not well suited to evaluate loans of long maturity, we use the PI instead.
34 Loans 
with above-median maturity (more than 22 months) often attracted markedly higher 
interest rates. Figure 2 plots the distributions. The unweighted mean (median) PI for long 
loans is 24% (13%), while that for short loans is 17% (11%). 
                                                 
34 The MIRR assumes that all intermediate positive cash flows are reinvested at the exogenously assumed 
reinvestment rate until the end of the contract. For long loans, this biases the estimated profitability towards 
the reinvestment rate. The PI is independent of loan maturity.   24 
Figure 2: Density of PIs by loan maturity 
 
After exploring some of the basic patterns, we continue our analysis in a 
multivariate setting. We do so by regressing a profitability measure  π on FX, a dummy 
variable for the use of foreign exchange clauses, COLL, a dummy for the use of collateral 
clauses, DUR, the maturity of the loan in months, PRIN, the total principal involved 
(abstracting from pure transfers), and N, a measure of the nationality of the lenders: 
        (1) 
One obvious problem with this approach is that our explanatory variables are not 
exogenous. The interest rate charged is the result of a bargaining process which 
simultaneously involved discussions about the use of collateral, the length of the loan, the 
use of foreign exchange clauses, and the like. None of the variation in the right-hand side 
variables is arguably determined in a way that is independent of the profitability measure. 
We do not claim that regressions along the lines of (1) uncover causal relationships. 
Instead, we think of the β-coefficients as measures of broad association between 
observable loan characteristics.  
Table 7 examines the correlates of profitability, as originally agreed in each 
contract. Those with a foreign exchange clause saw between 6.5% and 9.3% higher   25 
returns, a substantial premium. Contracts using collateral also attracted a higher return. 
This suggests that they involve riskier types of lending overall. Lending for longer raised 
the interest charged.
35 Smaller contracts were also marginally more expensive, but the 
estimated effect is not significantly different from zero.
36 Finally, the nationality of the 
lenders mattered. Those contracted with only German lenders attracted a markedly lower 
rate of return, while the Genoese did not lend at particularly favorable rates when 
compared with the Spaniards (excluded group).
37 When we add family dummies (not 
reported), their coefficients are almost always insignificant. 
                                                 
35 This result is based on the PI regressions. Since the MIRR has a downward bias that increases with the 
length of the contract, the negative duration sign on the MIRR regressions is neither surprising nor 
informative. The bias is related to the compound interest accumulated on intermediate positive cash flows. 
We control for it with a quadratic term. 
36 At a time when the concept of compounding was still in its infancy, there was a general tendency for 
short-term loans to be relatively more costly (Temin and Voth 2006). 
37 The regression exercise does not allow us to determine if the higher returns for Spaniards and Genoese 
attest to their ‘insider’ role, or reflect the fact that German lenders only participated in particularly safe 
loans.    26 
Table 7: Cross-sectional regressions 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Dep. Var.    MIRR      PI   
FX  0.085***  0.080***  0.093***  0.065**  0.069***  0.079*** 
  (2.65)     (2.60)  (2.82)  (2.50)  (2.68)  (2.86) 
             
Collateral    0.062**  0.057*    0.058**  0.050* 
    (2.15)  (1.90)    (2.09)  (1.79) 
             
Duration    -0.010***  -0.010***    0.002***  0.002*** 
    (-4.69)  (-4.71)    (2.94)  (3.13) 
             
Duration sq.    6.38E-5***  6.74E-5***       
    (3.96)  (3.96)       
             
Loan size      -6.78E+8      -5.24E-8 
      (-1.51)      (-1.31) 
             
Genoese      -0.015      -0.003 
      (-0.57)      (-0.10) 
             
Germans      -0.093***      -0.112*** 
      (-2.57)      (-3.17) 
             
Constant  0.192***  0.367***  0.380***  0.177***  0.098***  0.102*** 
  (9.38)  (6.91)  (6.60)  (10.27)  (3.99)  (4.15) 
N  402  402  402  402  402  402 
R
2  0.017  0.107  0.112  0.015  0.071  0.079 
Significance levels: *=10%, **=5%, ***=1% 
The overall explanatory power of our regressions is modest. The best-performing 
specifications in Table 7 explain a little over 11% of total variation of lending rates. 
While not satisfactory overall, these results are similar to those found in the modern 
finance literature.
38 
  On average, the general settlements caused losses for the lenders. What explains 
the cross-section of these differences? We define the variable LOSS_MIRR as the 
difference between the MIRR according to the settlement, and the promised MIRR, as 
per the original agreement. LOSS_PI is defined analogously. Loans with a foreign 
exchange component typically did quite poorly. This reflects the fact that the defaults 
happened in times of intense military strife, when most loans where contracted for 
delivery in foreign battlefields. Loans with a high collateral component showed higher 
returns; since the settlements took the presence of collateral into account when 
                                                 
38 Berger and Udell (1995), Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Petersen and Rajan (1995) find R-squared 
values of around 0.06 - 0.15 in modern-day data.   27 
determining the haircuts, this is not surprising. Longer durations are unambiguously 
associated with greater losses, while larger loans did somewhat better. Nationality did not 
confer a particular advantage when negotiating the settlements, nor were specific families 
favored over others. In combination, these two sets of regressions suggest that the 
heterogeneity in the rates of return and the losses sustained during the defaults were 
determined by the features of each particular loan, and did not reflect the particular 
negotiating position of a given set of bankers. 
Table 8: Correlates of losses during the defaults 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Dep. Var.    LOSS_MIRR      LOSS_PI   
FX  -0.036***  -0.036***  -0.044***  -0.055*  -0.056*  -0.076** 
  (-2.58)     (-2.61)  (-2.76)  (-1.85)  (-1.93)  (-2.34) 
             
Collateral    0.037***  0.039***    0.063*  0.065* 
    (2.88)  (2.84)    (1.92)  (1.75) 
             
Duration    -0.002***  -0.002***    -0.003***  -0.004*** 
    (-3.00)  (-3.00)    (-3.01)  (-3.00) 
             
Duration sq.    1.47E-5***  1.36E-5**       
    (2.67)  (2.43)       
             
Loan size      4.68E+8**      9.72E-8* 
      (2.18)      (1.70) 
             
Genoese      0.011      0.050 
      (0.72)      (1.36) 
             
Germans      0.005      0.000 
      (0.19)      (0.00) 
             
Constant  -0.041***  -0.020  -0.025**  -0.117***  -0.042*  -0.055** 
  (-7.21)  (-1.61)  (-2.08)  (-6.84)  (-1.75)  (-2.29) 
N  400  400  400  400  400  400 
R
2  0.020  0.048  0.057  0.009  0.082  0.094 
Significance levels: *=10%, **=5%, ***=1% 
Profitability over time 
How did lending rates change over time? Did the defaults make lending more expensive 
for the king? Is there evidence of mounting “debt intolerance”? Figure 3 plots the volume 
of lending and its profitability over time. The line, indexed to the left-hand axis, shows   28 
the weighted average of the ex-post MIRRs of contracts according to the year in which 
they were signed. The bars show the volume of actual lending every year.
39  
   
Figure 3: Profitability and volume of lending 
 
MIRRs fluctuated between 15 and 30%. The exceptions are the defaults and the 1597 
outlier.
40 Only contracts signed in 1573, 1574, 1575 and 1596 failed to earn the juro rate. 
There is virtually no correlation between MIRRs and lending volume – the correlation 
coefficient is -0.27, and falls to -0.16 if the year 1597 is removed from the sample. With 
the exception of a single contract signed in 1597 for a relatively small amount, there are 
no major spikes in rates. 
                                                 
39 This was calculated by adding up the disbursements that actually took place in the context of each 
contract, and assigning the total disbursed amount to the year in which the contract was signed. 
40 The outlier in 1597 was caused by a single contract for 586,000 ducats signed with several bankers 
affected by the default (AGS, Contadurías Generales, Legajo 93, ‘Francisco y Pedro de maluenda, Nicolas 
Doria, Marco Antonio Judice, Nicolas de Fornari y otros, asiento tomado con ellos sobre 600,000 escudos 
que han de proveer en Flandes, y 76,000 ducados que se les han de pagar de los que se les deben’). This 
contract had a MIRR of 89%, achieved by repaying a 40% premium on the amount borrowed over just six 
months. We don’t know the reasons for this rich return, and none are stated in the contract. Perhaps the 
king was compensating this particular group of bankers for the losses sustained in the 1596 default. 
Because this was the only contract signed in 1597, its MIRR is also the yearly average in our series.    29 
Table 9: Difference between average contracted and actual MIRRs 
Year contract 
was signed  1575 default  1596 default 
Year of default  30.9%  24.7% 
t-1  16.8%  9.4% 
t-2  11.6%  1.4% 
t-3  3.1%  1.2% 
t-4  1.7%  0.0% 
t-5  0.7%  0.0% 
t-6  0.9%  0.0% 
t-7  4.3%  0.0% 
 
Table 9 shows the average differential between ex-ante and ex-post MIRRs for contracts 
signed in the years leading up to each bankruptcy. The 1575 default was substantially 
more severe than the 1596 one. Consequently, the gap between contracted and actual 
rates was higher in the years leading up to 1575. The contracts affected were of longer 
duration – as much as 7 years in 1575, versus a maximum of four in 1596. The amount 
defaulted upon in 1575 was 14.6 million ducats and the average haircut 38%; in 1596, the 
king stopped servicing 7 million ducats of debt and negotiated a reduction of outstanding 
claims by 20%. These numbers reflect the severity of each fiscal crisis. In 1575, two 
simultaneous campaigns, three unusually poor fleets, and the reluctance of the Cortes to 
increase taxes led to a serious cash flow shortfall. In 1596, in contrast, taxes had already 
increased substantially. The liquidity shortfall was caused by a single delayed fleet, 
which arrived soon after the payment stop. Similarly to an insurance contract, the losses 
suffered by lenders were larger when the fiscal situation was more pressing. 
Net rates of return 
In our benchmark scenario, bankers obtained an average ex-post gross MIRR of 15.5%. 
To obtain a net measure of profitability, we need to subtract costs. Unfortunately, we do 
not observe most costs at the contract level. We instead use the available information on 
their general range to estimate the effect on the average rate of return. We conclude that 
costs were not sufficient to overturn the result that lending was profitable. However, they 
likely reduced our apparently high rates of return to a normal range.  
  The most important cost – that of financing – is captured by the long-term bond 
rate. Next, we need to consider the costs of intermediation. Lenders relied on a   30 
correspondent network. Its burden is reflected in the charges for issuing letters of 
exchange. Between 1566 and 1575, most contracts required disbursements either in cash 
at the treasury or via a letter of exchange drawn on a specific fair. When the latter was 
requested, the king was charged an additional 0.5% of the principal.
41 In addition, most 
bankers did not risk their own capital, but instead acted as intermediaries, splitting the 
contracts into smaller parts and selling them to individual investors. Their typical fee for 
this service was 1%.  
  Two other important sources of cost were currency conversions and transportation 
of bullion. Contracts with a foreign exchange component often specify that the banker 
will be reimbursed for ‘what is customary among businessmen.’
42 Sometimes the king 
requested an affidavit signed by three or four independent bankers attesting to the costs 
incurred. The king covered the largest component of transport cost directly, by providing 
free space on his ships. Because these costs were either reimbursed on top of all other 
payments to the bankers or incurred directly by the king, they do not affect the rate of 
return.
43 
  Several contracts include specific allowances for other costs. Our sample contract 
with the Maluenda brothers is a good example. The king agreed to pay the bankers a total 
of 5,490 ducats to cover any costs they might incur, without demanding that they account 
for them. This amounted to 1.6% of total payments by the king. We don’t know whether 
cost allowances covered actual costs, or whether they were merely used as a way to 
increase the rate of return. In our cash flows, we treat them in the same way as any other 
payment to the bankers. Hence, their effect is incorporated in the gross profitability 
figures. They typically amounted to 1-2% of the principal. 
  Finally, our rates of return are nominal. The second half of the sixteenth century 
saw the heyday of the price revolution, as inflows of American silver caused a general 
                                                 
41 When a cash disbursement at the court was requested, the specific language was ‘en esta corte en reales 
de contado.’ Because bankers or their agents resided and collected their payments whenever the court was 
stationed, this type of transaction would have carried the lowest transaction costs. When a disbursement 
was needed at a payments fair, either in Castile or abroad, the language was ‘en feria de [specific fair], en 
banco con cinco al millar’ – that is, as a bank draft with a five per thousand surcharge. 
42 The standard language is that the king will pay the bankers for ‘hasta lo que se acostumbra entre 
hombres de negocios.’ 
43 This would only be problematic for our results if the bankers systematically undercharged the king for 
these services. There is no evidence to suggest this.   31 
increase in the price level. Existing price indices are not accurate enough at yearly 
frequencies, preventing us from calculating real rates of return for each contract. Period 
averages are more reliable. Between 1556 and 1600, prices rose by 80% - an annualized 
rate of  1.7% (Drelichman 2005). 
We are now in a position to calculate net rates of return. The starting point is our 
benchmark estimate of 15.5%, which already takes into account the effect of the 
bankruptcies. We subtract the 7.14% opportunity cost, up to 1.5% in intermediation costs, 
up to 2% in other transaction costs, and 1.7% for inflation. This yields a net real rate of 
return of 3.16% in a high cost scenario. If intermediation or transaction costs for a 
specific contract were lower, net real rates of return could have been as high as 5%. 
While stressing that these are rough estimates, we note that a) they remain positive, in 
line with our general results and b) they are relatively modest values considering the risky 




Short-term lending to the Castilian crown was profitable. While the bankruptcies caused 
substantial losses for some bankers in the short run, they were more than offset by high 
returns in normal times. Few banking families failed to earn the rate of return of juros; 
even fewer actually lost money.    
When losses occurred, they were small in absolute terms. The families that did 
not perform well lent relatively little, and participated in the market only for short 
periods. The key to profitability was to invest heavily, and for the long haul. Timing 
mattered. The largest lender, the Spinola, realized a MIRR of 19.3% on over 16 million 
ducats of capital because they successfully reduced their exposure ahead of the two 
defaults in our dataset.
45 Those with negative rates of return happened to lend 
immediately before the bankruptcies. 
                                                 
44 We do not know to what extent bankers sold on the loans they issued. If they sold the loans on at lower 
rates of interest, their profits would have been higher still. In the absence of reliable information, we refrain 
from speculation. 
45 The Spinola seem to have correctly anticipated the 1575 default. Correspondence between family 
members shows they discussed its likelihood as early as January 1575, and made the determination to 
reduce their exposure. While they possessed a strong network of informants, it is unlikely that they were   32 
  We do not account for reschedulings that took place in the normal course of 
business. 78 asientos – almost 20% of the total – recognized and restructured earlier 
obligations that the Crown had failed to meet. This affected 24 different families. The 
average rescheduled amount was 108,946 ducats, almost half the loan value of an average 
asiento contract. Overall, 8.5 million ducats were rescheduled through different contracts, 
almost 10% of the total amount.
46 The asiento clauses in the new contract do not specify 
which loans were being rescheduled. They simply mention that payments from earlier 
contracts had been missed. This makes it impossible to correct cash flows for missed 
payments directly. We can still be certain that missed payments on earlier contracts only 
had a small impact on the calculated rates of return. Using the MIRR-based results, it 
would take losses of almost 9% of total capital to reduce profits to zero.
47 Because 
rescheduled amounts represent 10% of total loans, only outright repudiation of 90% of 
the missed payments could reduce returns to zero. This never occurred. In fact, the 
reschedulings emphasize the need to compensate bankers. Typically, the king would add 
all missed payments to the amounts due in the new contract. In many cases, additional 
interest was added to compensate bankers for the delay. As long as the later contract was 
fulfilled, overall profitability cannot have been reduced by much as a result of the 
reschedulings. 
  An additional safeguard is that we have calculated the profitability of bankers as 
if their loans to Philip II constituted their entire portfolio. While most of the banking 
families did not lend to other monarchs, they held a wide variety of assets in addition to 
asientos. These included juros, which offered reasonable returns throughout the sixteenth 
                                                                                                                                                
given privileged information in a systematic way. In fact, the decision to stop payments was not made until 
July 1575 at the earliest (Sanz Ayán 2004). 
46 In at least one very important case, the rescheduled amounts did not come from a previous loan. The 
largest rescheduling was for 2.3 million ducats with the Fugger family, originating from missed payments 
on a mercury provisioning contract from the Almadén mines. Once again, we take a conservative approach 
and consider all rescheduled amounts as originating from previous asientos. For the contract with the 
Fugger – one of the very few that actually specifies the origin of the rescheduled funds – , see AGS, 
Contadurías Generales, Legajo 87, ‘Marcos Fúcar y Juan y Jacome Fúcar hermanos. Asiento tomado con 
ellos en 22 de julio de 1582 sobre la paga y consignación de 905.665.459 que Su Majestad les debe a ellos 
y a los herederos de Aponal Fúcar y sobre un millón de ducados con que socorren a Su Majestad.’ 
47 Using the profit index, losses would have to amount to 9.3%. These are gross values. Estimating net 
required losses is difficult, as the bankers would have likely incurred lower costs if they did not fulfill part 
of a contract.   33 
century, as well as interests in Genoese commercial partnerships. Furthermore, many 
bankers acted as intermediaries, pooling resources obtained on European fairs while 
risking little of their own capital.
48 In the 1575 bankruptcy, when the king defaulted on 
14.6 million ducats, only four bankers had more than 100,000 ducats of their own capital 
at risk.
49 While our data do not allow us to estimate the composition of banker portfolios, 
it is safe to say that short-term sovereign lending was not the dominant component. 
Ex-post rates reflect the profitability of bankers in one specific state of the world. 
After accounting for the two bankruptcies in the period covered by our data, bankers 
earned a gross return of 8.3% over the long-term bond rate. This, however, was not the 
only possible outcome. Would bankers have fared much worse under alternative and, 
potentially, equally plausible scenarios? 
  The rates of return in our ‘repudiation’ scenario provide one answer. Had the king 
failed to pay back a single ducat in both the 1575 and 1596 defaults, bankers would have 
either broken even relative to the long-term bond rate, or made marginal losses. This is an 
extremely pessimistic scenario, and it could be argued that full repudiation was never a 
realistic risk. Bankers created a complex incentive structure to ensure that the king would 
come back to the table.
50 A different kind of risk nonetheless merits consideration. 
Instead of defaulting twice between 1566 and 1600, the king could have defaulted three, 
four or more times, each time settling for a fraction of his debts. 
  Speculating on when additional bankruptcies might have happened, or how severe 
they might have been, is beyond the scope of our work. Our calculations nonetheless 
allow for a simple thought experiment. According to our MIRR baseline results 
(‘settlement scenario’), bankers earned excess returns over the long-term bond rate of 
8.3%. The difference between the promised and the ‘settlement’ returns is 4.2%. This 
suggests that, if the two defaults that we observe were typical, the king could have 
                                                 
48 On the overall activities of Genoese bankers and their relationship with the business of lending to the 
Spanish crown in the sixteenth century see Doria (1978) and Felloni (1978). 
49 The bankers were Constantín Gentil, Lucián Centurión, Nicolao de Grimaldo, and the Spinola family (De 
Carlos Morales 2008). To the extent that bankers paid less to their depositors than the 7.14% opportunity 
cost of capital that we assumed, their returns would have been even higher as a result of effectively 
leveraging their returns. 
50 On this point, see Drelichman and Voth (2010b).   34 
defaulted an additional two times and settled on similar terms before the bankers would 
have failed to earn the long-term bond rate.
51  
To what extent do our results reflect perceptions of profitability at the time? 
Neither bankers nor royal officials thought in net present value terms, nor did they have 
the mathematical skills to calculate the rate of return from complex cash flows. This is 
unlikely to have resulted in incorrect decision-making. First, to value a perpetuity one 
does not actually need complex math. When the discount rate equals the yearly interest, 
the present value of a perpetual bond equals its face value, and the bond sells at par. This 
was the case with the majority of juros in the market – bankers effectively used a 
discount rate equivalent to the juro rate. Second, the text of the contracts makes it clear 
that everyone involved understood compound interest (described as ‘interest on interest’). 
The intellectual jump from compounding to discounting is very small. Finally, many 
complex assets were valued correctly long before the advent of modern finance.
52 
Ultimately, as long as bankers followed a principle that ‘more and earlier is better’, they 




One important goal of financial history is to determine the rate of return on different 
assets. In the case of bonds, most of the available data is based on nominal rates of 
interest, as contracted between borrower and lender (Homer and Sylla 2005). Since 
defaults, repudiations, and restructurings have been a constant feature of lending to 
sovereign borrowing, differences between ex-ante and ex-post rates can be large. Two 
detailed studies have derived actual returns to lenders for the period 1850-1983 (Lindert 
and Morton 1989) and 1920-39 (Eichengreen and Portes 1989). Lindert and Morton show 
that lending was profitable overall, earning average excess returns over British (or 
American) bonds of approximately 0.4%. We derive actual rates of return for borrowing 
before 1800, using estimates of actual cash flows. Key features of cross-border lending 
                                                 
51 The profit index yields similar results. 
52 See Moore and Juh (2006) for an example of correctly priced options before the development of the 
Black-Scholes formula.   35 
uncovered by Lindert and Morton (1989) and Eichengreen and Portes (1989) were 
already present at the dawn of sovereign borrowing – lenders earned a positive rate of 
return on average. In addition, we show that almost every lender to the king of Spain 
turned a profit. 
Contrary to the dominant view in both the historical and the serial defaults 
literature, lending to the Spanish Crown was not a hallmark of irrational behavior. After 
accounting for the effect of the defaults, the average rate of return on short-term lending 
was 15.5%, more than twice the long-term bond rate. Our sensitivity analysis and 
robustness checks show that lending was profitable even under highly unfavorable 
assumptions. Calculating profitability by family shows that those engaged in a long-term 
lending relationship with the Crown earned more than their opportunity cost in virtually 
all cases.  
  Our study focuses on the 1575 and 1596 defaults. This is dictated by data 
limitations. These bankruptcies affected loans contracted under the ‘Genoese system’, 
rather than those inherited from the personal dealings of Charles V. The settlements were 
reached quickly when compared to the modern experience (Benjamin and Wright 2008). 
With the exception of a single contract in 1597, rates of return remained broadly 
unchanged after each bankruptcy, suggesting that lenders viewed the defaults as largely 
anticipated events, and priced their loans accordingly. Short-term lending effectively 
acted as an insurance mechanism. In exchange for paying a premium in normal times, the 
king was able to reduce his outlays when his finances came under extraordinary pressure. 
The magnitude of these reductions was proportional to the severity of the liquidity crises. 
  Short-term loans and liquid long-term debt market formed an efficient issuance 
system for sovereign debt. Far from being a conduit for irrational behavior, these loans 
delivered substantial and largely stable profits to investors, while offering valuable 
insurance to the king. Spain built its empire with the strength of its resources – and on the 
ability to leverage them via powerful debt instruments.  
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Appendix A: Assumptions used in the reconstruction of asiento cash flows. 
 
The most important assumptions are those related to the valuation of juros, which the 
lenders often accepted as payment. The contracts refer to these bonds either by their face 
value and rate, or by their annual payment and face value. Because juros were simple 
annuities (or perpetuities), this information is sufficient to characterize them. To maintain 
consistency, we used the actual cash flow generated by the bonds, and discounted it using 
a benchmark rate of one fourteenth (7.14%). This choice of rate stems from the 
observation that juros that paid one fourteenth of their capital every year traded at par 
throughout the second half of the sixteenth century, and represented the vast majority of 
issues. When a perpetuity trades at par, the present value formula implies that the 
discount rate equals the annuity rate. Juros that paid 5% were used mostly as part of the 
settlements, and were more likely to trade at a discount (Toboso Sánchez 1987).  
We valuated the bonds using standard present value formulas. In the case of 
perpetual juros, we used the present value of the equivalent perpetuity. In the case of 
lifetime annuities, we used the early modern accounting convention that a lifetime was 
equivalent to 33 years. Since lifetime juros were relatively rare, modifying this 
assumption does not alter the results in any significant way. By definition, lifetime juros 
had shorter maturity than perpetual ones. The present value of a lifetime juro was 
therefore lower than that of a perpetual juro with the same face value and yield. We 
exploit this fact in coding the contract with the Maluenda brothers in the text. 
In some instances, the contract allowed the banker to change the ‘head’ of a 
lifetime annuity. This meant that a bond could be purchased from a very old person and 
registered in the name of a much younger one, thus extending the period during which it 
would continue to pay interest. When this happened, we assumed that bonds were 
purchased from persons that were three-fourths of the way into their lifetime. Once again, 
because of the relatively few instances in which this maneuver was used, modifying this 
assumption has little impact on the results. 
  Not all juros were created equal. Annual payments on bonds were made directly 
from the revenue streams backing them. If a particular tax source failed to perform in any 
given year some bondholders would not be paid, and the king was under no obligation to 
compensate them. As a general rule, most bonds were fully and regularly serviced, and 
their prices were very close to par. A notable exception were the juros backed by the 
revenues of the Casa de la Contratación. Introduced as part of the 1561 settlement, these 
juros were supposed to be serviced with the proceeds from the 20% tax that the Casa de 
la Contratación assessed on shipments of private silver. Because the silver revenues were 
considered a royal prerogative, however, the king could issue direct payment orders 
against them. The abuse of this practice left the Casa de la Contratación almost 
immediately unable to service the bonds it issued, and at the same time underscored the 
rationale for the requirement that juro issues only be authorized on revenues controlled 
by the Cortes.
53 The juros de contratación traded at deep discounts between their 
introduction and the 1577 general settlement, when they were retired. Many asientos, 
however, allowed bankers to discharge obligations using contratación bonds at par, or to 
                                                 
53 A detailed analysis of this episode can be found in Ruiz Martín (1965). See also De Carlos Morales 
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exchange them for other bonds with the same face value without penalty. This created an 
immediate profit opportunity not available to common bondholders. To estimate these 
gains we follow the evidence in De Carlos Morales (2008), which shows that juros de 
contratación traded at 50% of their face value. 
A second set of assumptions was needed to determine the dates in which certain 
payments were expected to take place. Most disbursements and repayments were 
stipulated on specific dates, or at fairs with well-known time frames. In the few instances 
when the month in which a fair took place cannot be determined with precision, we made 
educated guesses based on information about the fairs immediately preceding and 
following it. In some cases, as in the contract with the Maluenda brothers, the time of 
payment was tied to the arrival of the silver fleets, which was subject to mining 
production and weather events. The contracts were signed without knowing when (or if) 
the fleets would arrive. Morineau (1985) reports the actual arrival dates for most fleets 
after 1584. Their median arrival month was September, with over 80% of them arriving 
between July and November. Since the contracts specified that payments would take 
place one month after the fleet’s arrival, we entered the cash flows tied to the fleet’s 
arrival as being expected in the month of October. Most contracts specified an additional 
1% monthly interest should the fleet arrive late, and a 1% monthly discount should it be 
early. This allowed the king to match his revenues to his outlays, while introducing little 
variation in the overall profitability of the contract if the deviations from the expected 
arrival times were small. 
 
Appendix B: Notes on the Modified Internal Rate of Return 
 
While very useful in establishing the rate of return of complex cash flows, the MIRR 
requires the exogenous specification of two discount rates. The obvious choice for a 
reinvestment rate is the juro yield of 7.14%. Juros were relatively safe investments that 
could be traded on a fairly liquid market. Any banker with the financial wherewithal to 
lend to Philip II could certainly secure a long-term bond at par if he found himself with 
any excess cash. Many bankers were able to do better with their funds, as their continued 
participation in lucrative asientos shows. The more active families also scoured the 
secondary juro market for bonds that were not performing well, purchasing them at a 
discount and using their connections to redeem them at par. The standard juro rate, 
therefore, is a safe lower bound for the reinvestment rate. 
Specifying the finance rate is trickier. Despite misleading technical notes to the 
contrary in financial software and trade publications, the finance rate is not an interest 
rate paid on borrowed funds, but rather a discount rate used to measure the opportunity 
cost of negative flows. Intuitively, the MIRR formula assumes that the lender has to 
gather the present value of all disbursements at time zero. Whatever is not immediately 
disbursed is placed in a savings account, where it earns the finance rate. This enables the 
lender to exactly meet the required disbursements as they come due. This formulation has 
the desirable property that deferring disbursements increases the project’s rate of return. 
The first derivative of the formula with respect to the finance rate is positive. Specifying 
a higher finance rate will, ceteris paribus, increase the overall rate of return for the   41 
project. The lowest logical rate of return will hence result from specifying a finance rate 
equal to zero.
54 
Common practice holds that the finance rate used to valuate a project should be 
the interest cost incurred on borrowed funds. The definition of the MIRR, however, does 
not lend any logical support to this practice. Bankers with access to the funds required by 
a project in advance could very well earn the reinvestment rate until the disbursements 
came due. We will bias the results against finding profitability by specifying the finance 
rate at 5% for our benchmark estimates. This was the lowest yield of any juro that was 
not part of a forced conversion, and clearly below the average yield of long-term debt. 
We also conduct sensitivity analysis by lowering the finance rate all the way to zero. 
Since intermediate negative cash flows are substantially smaller than intermediate 
positive ones, the impact of any finance rate assumption will be limited. 
 
Appendix C: Additional profit index results 
 
Table C1 reports the weighted average profit index for all contracts using five different 
discount rate assumptions. Its results closely track those obtained using the MIRR 
(reported in Table 5 in the main text). 
 
Table C1: Profit index (all contracts, 1566-1600, annualized rates) 
Discount rate  Original 
agreement  Settlements  Repudiation 
0.00%  34.4%  18.6%  8.2% 
5.00%  25.3%  11.7%  2.7% 
7.14%  22.1%  9.2%  0.7% 
10.00%  18.3%  6.2%  -1.7% 
17.19%  10.5%  0.0%  -6.7% 
 
The profit index also suggests an alternative way of measuring the overall returns to 
short-term lending. Instead of calculating a weighted average of the rate of return of each 
contract, we aggregate the cash flows into a single project running from 1566 to 1600.
55 
This effectively treats the collective of bankers as a single financial entity, whose rate of 
return we now calculate. We still use the undiscounted sum of all disbursements as our 
measure of capital at risk. Since most disbursements were more than offset by 
                                                 
54 While the MIRR formula allows for negative finance rates, it would not be rational for an investor to 
borrow unneeded funds and pay interest on them until they are disbursed. 
55 The MIRR is ill-suited for this type of exercise, as it assumes that intermediate positive cash flows 
continue to earn the reinvestment rate until the end of the project. A positive cash flow in 1566, for 
example, would be assumed to earn the reinvestment rate all the way until 1600. Since by the very nature of 
lending the absolute value of positive cash flows exceeds that of negative ones, this causes the MIRR to 
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repayments within a few months or years, this grossly exaggerates capital at risk, and 
hence underestimates actual returns. 
Table C2: Profit index (aggregate cash flows, 1566-1600, annualized rates) 
Discount rate  Original 
agreement  Settlements  Repudiation 
0.00%  35.2%  19.1%  8.6% 
5.00%  13.6%  6.11%  2.2% 
7.14%  9.5%  3.8%  1.0% 
10.00%  6.0%  1.8%  0.0% 
15.55%  2.4%  0.0%  -1.0% 
 
Table C2 shows that, calculated this way, lending to Philip II would have been profitable 
with discount rates up to 15.5% This is a remarkable result. The overall returns to 
sovereign lending remain positive even under the enormous weight of using an already 
inflated measure of capital at risk and leaving it undiscounted over a 34-year period. 
 
 